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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAlVIES ORVILLE \VOOD,VARD, ,
GLEN WOODWARD, THELMA
DALTON and JOYCE DICKASON,
Plaintiffs-Respondcnts,
vs.

Case No.
11593

RESSIE MONSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant and respondents are children of one
James Leon Woodward. After the decease of James
Leon 'V oodward, respondents filed suit against appellant seeking the Court to impose a constructive trust
on the proceeds of a bank account held in the names
of appellant and her father as joint tenants. Respondents further sought distribution of said proceeds on a
per capita basis.
I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the pre-trial hearing the Court ruled that
appellant had the burden of going forth with the evidence and that appellant had the burden of proving
all of the elements of a gift of the proceeds of the joint
bank account by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant objected to this ruling at the pre-trial hearing an<l
also immediately prior to the trial in this matter.
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on January 15, 1969. At said
trial appellant carried the burden of going forth with
the evidence and the burden of proof on the issue of
whether or not there had been a gift to appellant by
her father of the proceeds of the joint bank account.
The Court ruled that there was no gift or transfer
of the
in the joint bank account to appellant
and that the decedent intended to make a testamentary
disposition of the funds. The issue of whether or not
there was a constructive trust was never tried before
the Court.
The Court entered judgment in favor of respondents after adjustment for expenses of last illness, burial,
and other disbursements. Appellant filed a motion for
a new trial which was denied by the Court and the
subject appeal was filed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that the trial court committed
serious and prejudical error at the time of trial and
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that the procedure used by the trial court together
with the evidence require reversal of the judgmeut
as a matter of law.

STATElVIENT OF FACTS
Appellant and respondents are the surviving children of James Leon 'V oodward, who died intestate
on August 31, 1964, in Ogden, Utah. Prior to his death,
l\Ir. 'Voodward owned a small farm near Preston,
Idaho. In 1942 Mr. Woodward was divorced from his
wife and was a single man at the time of his death.
During the years immediately preceding his death, it
was l\Ir. Woodward's custom to spend the wintertime
and weekends during the summertime in an apartment in Ogden, Utah, and the balance of the year at
his farm near Preston, Idaho (T-14). During his
stay in Ogden it was his custom to visit appellant
two or three times a week ( T-24). In addition to these
visits and eating meals at appellant's, appellant took
the decedent to Salt Lake City for cobalt treatments
in connection with his cancer condition and he later
stayed at appellant's house until taken to the hospital where he died ( T-24, 25, 63, & 64). In contrast,
respondents seldom, if ever, visited their father either
in Preston or in Ogden. Respondent James Orville
'V oodward was not aware of his father's address in
Ogden, didn't see him in the hospital prior to his death,
and didn't attend his viewing nor his funeral (T-139,
143 & 144). Respondent Glen 'Voodward saw his father

3

only twice in the year of his father's death and his
father had been only once in his son's house in Salt
Lake City from 1958 to the time of his death in 19tH
(T-117 & 120). Respondent Thelma Dalton had directed her father not to come to her house and visit
her any more, took sides with her mother against her
father after the divorce, refused to visit him at his
farm in Preston because she considered the living
conditions crude, did not visit him in the hospital during his last illness and did not attend his viewing or
his funeral ( T-36, 84, 9'0, 91, 93, 94 & 95). Respondent
Joyce Dickason lived in California and 1Haryland
during the last years of her fa th er' s life and had very
little contact with him, did not see him during his last
illness, did not attend his viewing nor his funeral ( T-8,
40, Ill, & 112).
In the summer of 1963 the decedent came to Ogden
and had appellant sign a bank card creating a joint
tenancy savings account in the First Security Bank
of Preston, Idaho, in the names of appellant and the
deceased ( T-7 4) . The proceeds represented moneys
received from a sale of part of the farm land (T-55
& 56).
After the decease of Mr. Woodward, appellant
had the proceeds of the joint savings account in the
sum of $12,500.00 transferred to the Bank of Ben
Lomond in Ogden, Utah, and retained the proceeds
as her own after paying her father's expenses of last
illness and burial expenses and after giving her mother
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$1,000.00 and each of the respondents $1,000.00 with

tlie exception of respondent James Orville Woodward
( T- 59 & 78) . The house and remaining farm land were
probated in Idaho and appellant and respondents
received equal distributive shares ( T-60) .
Respondeints made no claim in the probate for a
Ehare of the proceeds of the joint bank account but later
filed suit in Utah under the theory of a constructive
trust ( T-59, 60 & R-1). At the pre-trial hearing the
Court ruled that appellant would have the burden of
going forth with the evidence and establishing all the
elements of a gift of the bank account by clear and
convincing evidence (R-17). Appellant objected to
this both at the pre-trial hearing and by motion on
the morning of the trial arguing that the burden was
upon respondents to establish a constructive trust and
to carry the burden of going forth with the evidence
( T-2 & 6). After a trial before the Court sitting without
a jury, the Court found that there was no gift of the
bank proceeds to appellant and entered judgment m
favor of respondents (R-34 & 39).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN COMPELLING APPELLANT TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF GOING FORTH 'VITH THE EVIDENCE AND
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IN TRYING THE CASE ON THE ISSUE OF
GIFT RATHER THAN ON THE ISSUE 0.F
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.
Respondents' complaint pleads a cause of action
based on a constructive trust theory as described in
paragraph 6 of the complaint, i. e., "A constructive
trust should be declared with respect to the funds held
by said Bessie Monson from said joint account ... "
( R-2 ) . At the pre-trial hearing, the court ruled that
the decedent was a resident of Idaho and that Idaho
law was controlling (R-15). The trial court relied on
the case of Idaho First National Bank vs. First National Bank of Caldwell, et al., 340 P.2d 1094 (Idaho
1959) , which involved an action by an administrator
to recover for the decedent's estate certain funds deposited in a joint account of the decedent and defendants. The Idaho Court held that defendants were
required, once the question of intent of the decedent
was raised, to assume the burden of proof and to establish by clear and convincing evidence all the elements
of an inter vivos gift.
The Utah trial court in the instant case followed
Idaho's substantive law and procedural law as well.
It is appellant's contention that when the trial court
compelled appellant to carry the burden of going
forth with the evidence it committed prejudicial error
in failing to follow Utah procedural law or the larv
of the forum.
The Restatement Of The Law of Conflicts Of
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Laws, §592, provides that the law of the forum governs all matters of pleading and the conduct of protecdings in court. And further, §595 provides that the
law of the forum governs the proof in court of a fact
alleged as well as the presumptions and inferences to
be drawn from the evidence. And more particularly in
Comment a. the following is found:
"Proof in court covers all matters falling
within the description 'burden of proof'. This
includes what is sufficient evidence on an issue
of fact to entitle the jury to consider it. It includes the burden of going forward with the
evidence; also the question of which party bears
the risk of non-persuasion of the trier of the
fact."
In agreement to the foregoing is 16 Am Jur 2d
S7(), p. 120, which provides as follows:
"In matters of procedure, or, as sometimes
stated, in matters of remedial rights, it is clearly
settled that every case must be governed by the
law of the place where the remedy is sought.
This rule applies in general to all matters of
pleading, including the sufficiency of pleadings,
or whether a cause of action is stated in a pleading, and the rules of pleading, to rules of evidence and rules of practice; to matters pertaining to modes of procedure and form of remedy,
including what form of action is proper and
whether
the action must be at law or in equity;
,,
In 168 ALR 191, the following is found:
"As stated in the original annotation, questions of evidence, as for instance its admissi-
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bility, sufficiency, etc., are regarded as purely
questions of remedy to be governed by the law
of the forum, and the question of the presumption and burden of proot is, at least by the weight
of authority, ordinarily regarded as subject to
the same rule; and, as a general i:ule, as between
conflicting rules as to presumption and burden
of proof prevailing at the situs of the transacaction and in the forum, that of the latter jurisdiction has been accorded precedence, the rule
of the former being rejected as merely relating
to the remedy and being of no extraterritorial
force."
The Utah Court followed the general rule in the
case of Buhler v. lJ-'laddison, 166 P.2d 205 (1946), which
involved a workmen's compensation claim wherein the
injury occurred in Nevada and the trial was had in
Utah. At page 209 of the opinion, the Utah court
indicated as follows :
"This action is prosecuted in the
of
Utah upon a cause of action arising in Nevada.
The merits of the controversy, the elements of
the cause of action, the substantive rights are
determined by the law of Nevada; the trial of
the action, the procedural matters including the
making of proof and rules of evidence are controlled by the law of Utah."
It is appellant's further contention that the substantive law of Utah should have been controlling in
this case upon the grounds that the joint tenancy bank
account was a three party contract between the decedent, appellant and the First Security Bank of
Preston, Idaho. It i.s uncontested that appellant signed
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the bank signature card in Ogden, Utah, approximately
one year prior to decedent's death ( T-56, 57 & '7 4).
This was the last act necessary for the validity of the
three party contract.
In lo Am .Jur 2d §39, p .58, the following is found:
"It is a familiar rule that the construction
and validity of a contract are governed by
law of the place where it is made."

In this connection see the Utah case of Kansas City
J!rholcsale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corporation,
73 P.2d 1272 (1937), wherein the following is found
at page 1274:
"A contract between parties in different states
is made at the place where the last act necessary
to give it validity is performed."
It seems clear that Utah's substantive law should
have been followed by the trial court as well as Utah
procedural law upon the grounds that the agreement
was finalized in Utah.

If the trial court had followed Utah's substantive
or procedural law_. or both, the result would have been
in favor of appellant. Utah has no counterpart of Idaho
law as set forth in the case of Idaho First National
Bank v. First National Bank of Caldwell, et al., as
previously cited. The Idaho precedent, as set forth
in this case, is both dangerous and a catalyst for litigation. The following is found in the dissenting opinion
at page 1100:
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" ... the effect of the decision of the majority
is to create further uncertainity as to the effect
of joint and survivorship bank accounts on the
death of an owner-depositer."
And further at page 1101:
"It appears to us that the ruling of the majority in this case will nullify the Gray case,
and is tantamount to holding that the creation of
a joint account, with the right of survivorship,
in the matter selected by the decedent is without
force or effect. The majority rule would permit
such an act to be challenged in virtually every
instance; the anomaly is born that the survivor
must prove the decedent did precisely what he
unequivocally stated in writing that he did. The
bank card, or joint account agreement, states that
the funds deposited with the bank 'shall be owned
by (the parties to the joint account) jointly, with
the right of survivorship, and be subject to the
order or receipt of either of them or the survivor
of them . . . '. The language is clear, without
ambiguity, unequivocal. These words can be, and
we believe are, clearly understood or understandable by the public. If we are to give any effect
to these accounts, why should this clearly expressed intention be ignored?"

If the Idaho precedent is followed, which places

the burden on a joint depositer to prove a valid gift,
the integrity of a joint tenancy bank account is nullified. Attorneys would immediately counsel their clients
to test any joint tenancy agreement in court, whether
involving personal or real property, upon the basis that
the joint owner may not be able to prove all the elements
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of a valid gift. The impact on the public and the courts
is obvious.
The procedure of requiring claimants to prove a
constructive trust regarding the proceeds of a joint
bank account or of jointly held real property serves
as a safeguard to the integrity of jointly owned property agreements since it requires the claimant to prove
fraud or some form of unconscionable conduct. The
burden is upon the claimant to go forth with such
evidence. In the event there is no evidence of fraud or
wrong doing, there is no basis for litigation and the
property goes to the joint owner pursuant to the proYisions of the joint agreement.

In 54 Am J ur §218, p. 167, it is stated that an
implied trust by operation of law arises when one
holds property by fraud, duress, or by commission of
a wrong or any form of unconscionable conduct. In
at page 172 it provides that the disappointment
of a mere expectation does not give rise to a constructive
trust.
The following case is typical of the general law
which holds that fraud, actual or constructive, is an
essential element for a constructive trust. Boardman
v. Kendrick, 280 P.2d 1053, 59 N.NL 167.
In 54 Am J ur §242, page 184, the fallowing is
found:
"The general rule is that a constructive trust
arises where an heir, devisee, or legatee violates
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a promise to the testator, expressly made or inferable from words or conduct, to hold an inheritance, devise or legacy for another or to
give it to another, upon which the testator relied
in the making or changing his will in order to
favor such other person; but it is generally held
in such cases that the proof 11iust establish the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the constructive trust •with an extraordinar.IJ degree of
certainty and clarity." (emphasis added)
This protection was neutralized by the Utah trial
court when it required appellant to carry the burden
of going forth with the evidence.
The earlier Idaho cases recogniz.ed a constructive
trust based upon fraud as evidenced by the case of
Brasch v. Brasch, 47 P.2d 676 ( 1935). The Utah Supreme Court has followed the traditional concept of
constructive trust dm,·n through the years. One of the
earlier cases is the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P.
527 ( 1908) . In this case the court made the following
comment at page 530:
" ... A second well-settled and even common
form of trusts ex maleficio occurs whenever a
person acquires the legal title to land or other
property by means of an intentionally false and
fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for
a certain specified purpose-as, for example, a
promise to convey the land to a designated inclividual, or to reconvey it to the grantor, and
the like-and having thus fraudulently obtained
the title, he retains, uses, and claims the property as absolutely his own, so that the whole
by rri.eans of which the ownership
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is obtained is in fact the scheme of actual deceit.
Equity regards such a person as holding the
property charged with a constructive trust and
will compel him to fulfill the trust by
according to his engagement."
The Chadwick case was reaffirmed in the case of
Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372 (1953).
The present status of the Utah law is reflected in
the case of Jewell v. Horner, 366 P.2d 594, 12 Utah
2<l 328 ( 1961), which held that the evidence failed to
support a finding of a parol trust in favor of sons with
respect to real property which had been conveyed by
the decedent to his daughter. At page 597 of the opinion
Justice Callister made the following observation:
" ... To justify a court in determining from
oral testimony that a deed which purports to
convey land absolutely in fee simple was intended to be something different, such as a trust,
such testimony must be clear and convincing.
The proof must be something more than that
modicum of evidence which this court sometimes
holds to be sufficient to warrant a finding where
the matter is not so serious as to the overthrow
of a clearly expressed deed, solemnly executed
and delivered."
It would seem that this reasoning holds for the
instant case since the integrity of joint bank accounts
an<l other joint property agreements are just as substantial as a deed of conveyance.
The Utah trial court committed prejudicial error
in its procedural rulings in this matter and should be
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reversed upon the grounds that the Utah courts on both
substantive and procedural grounds have required
claimants seeking to impose trusts on jointly held property to carry the burden of going forth with the evidence
and showing by a preponderance of the evidence some
fraud or unconscionable conduct. Such conduct \Vas
totally lacking in the case at bar.

POINT II
THE
OF THE COURT 'VAS
CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
It is undisputed that a bank account in the nature
of a joint tenancy was created in the names of the
decedent and appellant (R-1). Exhibit 1-C is the bank
signature card and is found at page 21 of the record.
The following language is pertinent to the issue at
bar:
"The joint depositors whose names are signed
on the reverse side of this card hereby agree with
each other and with the above bank that all sums
now on deposit heretofore or hereafter deposited
by any one or more of said joint depositors with
said bank to their credit as joint depositors, with
all accumulations thereon, are and shall he
owned by them jointly with the right of survivorship, and be subject to the check if the account
is a checking account or receipt if the account
is a savings account of any one or more of them
or of the survivors or survivor of them, and pay-
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ment to or on the check or receipt of any one
or more of them or the survivor shall be valid
and discharge said bank from liability." (emphasis added)
At the time the decedent had appellant sign the
joint bank card the only condition placed on the withdrawal of the money was that appellant take care of
burial expenses ( T-56 and 57) . It would seem that
the provisions of the joint bank card should be controlling vesting the title in the bank proceeds in the
sunivor subject only to appellant's agreement to take
care of the decedent's burial expenses. At no time did
the decedent indicate to appellant that the balance of
the proceeds were to be divided among the other children. The integrity of the written instrument creating
the joint tenancy and the included ownership rights
should be held intact.
The sister-in-law of decedent testified that he told
her on the day of his death that "You don't need to
worry about that. I have money in the bank for Bessie,
in her name" (T-11 & 12).
The brother of the decedent, who was very close
to him during his stays in Ogden, testified that the
decedent had told him "If I have anything when I am
gone, I want Bessie and her family to have it" (T-18).
Dorothy Miller, a close friend during the decedent's
stays in Ogden, testified that the decedent said regarding respondent James Orville Woodward, "I'll
never give him another 'D' dime" (T-37). Mrs. Miller
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further testified that on the Sunday afternoon of the
decedent's death she stayed with him at the hospital
and sat and talked with him. She testified that the
at that time that the bank account "is
decedent
in Bessie's name and my name, Bessie is to pay my bills,
funeral bill and hospital, whatever I owe and over that,
what is left is hers" ( T-38) . This witness again reaffirmed this on page 39 of the transcript as follows:
"Q. You heard him say that Bessie was to pay
the bills and the rest was hers ?
"A. Oh, yes; she was to 'pay all the bills and
pay my funeral and everything I owe, she is to
pay that off and the rest is hers' ".

The Idaho attorney who handled the probate advised appellant that the money was hers and not
respondents' ( T-150). The $4,000.00 paid to respondents Glen "\V oodward, Thelma Dalton, and Joyce Dickason and to their mother was not allowed as an inheritance tax deduction on the basis that it was a gift only
(T-59).
The brother of the decedent further testified that
appellant was the only child that the decedent ever
spoke about and that the decedent said to him, "If it
wasn't for Bessie, I wouldn't have any place to go
except your place" (T-15). He further testified that
the decedent had cried about the treatment he had
received from respondent Thelma Dalton and had said,
"Thelma told me, she says, Daddy, I don't want you
to come to my place anymore. I don't want you to meet
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my friends" ( T-17). He also testified that appellant
and only one of the respondents attended the viewing
and funeral of their father (T-19).
l\Ir. and l\lrs. Lawrence Webb, decedent's landlords while decedent was in Ogden, testified that appellant and decedent's brother were the only visitors at
ihe apartment except for one visit by one of the respondents during the years that the decedent rented
their apartment ( T-23, 24 and 31). They further
testified that the decedent visited appellant approximately 2 or 3 times a week and that appellant was the
one he called on to drive him to Salt Lake City for
cobalt treatments ( T-24 and 25). They testified that
decedent had advised them that "Well, he said that
Bessie is the only one that he could depend upon" ( T24 and 32).

Dorothy Miller testified that the decedent told
her he wasn't wanted at the homes of his other children
and that they treated him cold every time he would
go there ( T-35). She further testified that the decedent
told her, "I think I will stay away from all of them
but Bessie" ( T-36) .
On cross examination of Mrs. Miller, respondents'
attorney questioned her concerning what the decedent
had said about taking care of all of his children and
she replied that the decedent told her "He told me all
along that he didn't think they deserved anything. He
said, they didn't treat him like a father" (T-39). In
response to a question from respondents' attorney con-
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cerning whether or not she had seen any of the other
children visit the deceased at the hospital during his
last illness, l\!Irs. l\!Iiller answered no and then testified,
"Because I asked him, I said, 'do the children know
you are sick,' and be said, 'yes,' I said 'have they been
over to see you,' and he looked at me just like that, just
like he was making fun of me asking him that question"
(T-40).

:Respondent James Orville 'V oodward testified
that he didn't attend the viewing or funeral, didn't see
his father in the hospital during his last illness and did
not know the address of his father's apartment in Ogden
(T-139, 143 and 144). He further testified that he
did not know that his father had sold part of the farm
and that he had no letters in his possession nor had
he had any conversations with his father which reflectc<l
that appellant had ever agreed to divide the proceeds
of the bank account with the other children (T-143).
Respondent Glen Woodward testified that he had
supervised the probate and had chosen the probate
attorney as well as picked a friend to be the administrator of his father's estate (T-107). He testified that
appellant had always claimed that the proceeds of
the bank account were hers ( T-110). He testified
that he did not know when his father's birthday was,
sent no birthday presents and saw his father only twice
in the year of his death in 1964 (T-116 and 117). He
testified further that he had lived in Salt Lake City
since 1958 and that his father had been in his house
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only once ( T-120). He was never apprised by his
father that part of the farm had been sold and testified
that he had no letter nor had he had any conversations
with his father indicating that appellant had promised
to divide the bank proceeds with the other children.
,(T-120).
Respondent Joyce Dickason lived outside of the
state of Utah during the last years of her father's life
and had very little contact with him ( T-54 and 112) .
She also failed to attend the viewing or funeral of her
father ( T-8). She made no appearance at the trial of
this cause and accordingly did not testify.
Respondent Thelma Dalton testified that she did
not visit her father in the hospital during his last illness
and di<l not attend the viewing or funeral ( T-84, 90
and 91). She testified that after the divorce she took
sides with her mother against her father and that her
father was aware of her feelings in this regard ( T-93,
04< and 97). She testified that she chose not to go to
his farm in Idaho because the living was "so crude out
there and his water and everything, that was no place
for a lady to spend" ( T-95) . She testified that it was
her custom not to give him Christmas presents, birthday presents and not to send him mail ( T-98). She
further testified that her father had never told her part
of the farm was sold, and that she had no letters from
him nor had she any conversations with him indicating
that appellant had agreed to divide the proceeds of the
bank account (T-99 and 100).
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Appellant strongly urges that the foregoing testimony of independent witnesses and of respondents
justifies a reversal of the judgment based upon the rule
set forth in Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229 (Utah 1949)
at page 233 of the opinion wherein the Court said:
" 'The findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly a pp ears that the court has misapplied
proven facts or made findiugs clearly against the
weight of the evidence.' "
CONCLUSION
Appellant
that the trial court committed
prejudicial error when it chose to follow Idaho law
both on substantive and procedural matters, and by
doing so, casting aside the whole theory of respondents'
cause of action of a constructive trust. The precedent
of requiring a defendant to carry the burden of going
forth with the evidence and assuming the burden of
proof in a case of this type is dangerous indeed because
of its tendency to create litigation and its attack on
the integrity of written instruments creating joint
ownerships in property.
It is appellant's further assertion that the testimony at the trial established clear and convincingly
that the decedent intended that appellant should have
the proceeds of the joint bank account due to the close
relationship he had with appellain't during the last
years of his life and the neglect of respondents.
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It is respectfully submitted that the posture of this
case compels a reversal based on the law and the facts.

Respect£ ully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER,
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
RICHARD H. THORNLEY, Esq.
200 Kisel Building

Ogden, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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